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I. Introduction
There are a variety of issues that arise in the course of employment
relationships. In Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch,' the Minnesota Court of
Appeals considered whether Minnesota law will prohibit the enforce-
ment of a restrictive covenant in an employment contract that lacks
geographic limits.2 The court held that a restrictive covenant so
lacking geographically is not per se invalid.3
The central issue in Dynamic Air was whether an employee, who has
entered into an otherwise valid employment contract, may be enjoined
from working for a competitor by the operation of a restrictive
covenant which contains a reasonable time element but is entirely
lacking in geographic bounds.' In Dynamic Air, the court held that if
the contract is otherwise enforceable,' a lack of geographic limits will
not render the contract per se unenforceable. 6 In reaching this
decision, the court complemented a previous decision of the Minneso-
ta Supreme Court which held that a restrictive covenant with
reasonable geographic limits but unlimited as to time is enforceable.7
1. 502 N.W.2d 796 (Minn. CL App. 1993).
2. Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch, 502 N.W.2d 796 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
3. Id. at 799-800.
4. Id. The temporal restriction imposed on Mr. Bloch by the employment
covenant was two years. Id. at 797-98.
5. Id. The court stated that the "reasonableness of a covenant is based on several
factors, not on the presence or absence of any one of them." Id.
6. Id. at 800.
7. See Larx Co. v. Nicol, 224 Minn. 1, 10, 28 N.W.2d 705, 710 (1947).
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This Note examines restrictive covenants in employment contracts
as they exist in Minnesota. This Note supports the Dynamic Air court's
conclusion that a per se 8 rule emasculating restrictive covenants
lacking geographic bounds is unnecessary. This Note's support for the
court's decision is, however, tempered by the court's own caveat9 that
rulings on the enforceability of restrictive covenants bereft of
geographic limits must necessarily be fact driven, and therefore arrived
at only on a case-by-case basis.'0
II. General Background
A. Historical Background of Restrictive Covenants
As early as the seventeenth century, restrictive covenants in the
employment arena were viewed with skepticism" and were commonly
held unenforceable. 2 The chief point of contention for judges who
struck down restrictive covenants was that they operated in restraint of
trade, and thus were contrary to the interests of a free market.' In
an important early English case'4 in which a baker was restrained by
a restrictive covenant ancillary to the sale of his business," the court
acknowledged the harm potentially inflicted not only on the covenan-
tor who lost his trade, but also on the public whose choice of products
8. Dynamic Air, 502 N.W.2d at 800.
9. The court stated:
There may very well be instances in which a restrictive covenant unlimited as
to territory is reasonably necessary to protect the employer's interests, for
example, in employment with multinational corporations. We therefore must
leave determination of the reasonableness of restrictive covenants lacking
territorial limits to trial courts; they have the means to consider this issue in
individual cases by hearing evidence from the Parties.
Id.
10. Id.
11. A.G. GuEsT, ANSON's LAW OF CONTRACT 319-21 (26th ed. 1984).
12. Id. at 319.
13. Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARv. L REv. 625, 626
(1960).
14. Id. at 629 (citing Mitchell v. Reynolds, I P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B.
1711)).
15. For a general discussion of restrictive covenants, see 6A ARTHUR L. CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1385-94 (1962). The issue of enforceability of restrictive
covenants comes into play in two different areas. First, an individual selling a business
covenants with the purchaser not to compete. Id. § 1385, at 45. This is largely in
response to the purchaser's desire to get the full value of whatever good will comes
with the business. Id. at 46. Second, and central for present purposes, an employee
covenants with an employer not to compete after the employment relationship is
terminated. Id. § 1394, at 89. Common elements employers seek to protect are
customer lists, trade secrets or virtually anything peculiar to an individual business
which might give its competitors an unearned edge. Id. at 97.
[Vol. 21
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and services had been limited by the covenant.' 6 Thus, courts have
long recognized that the effects of a covenant not to compete can
have undesirable ramifications extending well beyond the parties to
the agreement.'
7
The advent of the Industrial Revolution altered the relationship
between employees and employers and thus catalyzed the evolution of
restrictive covenants.' Society had become more mobile, and the
traditional apprenticeship system was inexorably giving way to
increasingly modem training procedures.' 9 Thus, an employee was
less likely to be tied to a specific area or employer such that the effects
of a restrictive covenant encompassing only the immediate geographic
area were less drastic.
20
Despite this ostensible emancipation, however, in many respects the
employee found a greater dependence on his vocation for a liveli-
hood.21 Larger and fewer employers dominated the market place
and the relationship between the master and servant became more
distant than it had been under the earlier apprenticeship system.2
Thus, there remained tangible threats to the employee confronted by
a restrictive covenant. At the same time, employers found an
increasing need to protect their ever expanding business interests
from competitors willing to lure the valuable employee away.25 These
opposing interests required a new, more flexible approach to the issue
of enforcement of restrictive covenants.
214
Recognizing the need for flexibility, courts began to soften their
position when presented with restrictive covenants.2' This recogni-
tion subsequently evolved into the modem standard for making a
16. GUEST, supra note 11, at 319.
17. Blake, supra note 13, at 627.
18. Id. at 638.
19. Id.
20. Id. Professor Blake states that long apprenticeships were no longer necessary
since job training could take place for the average factory job in less than a month.
Id.
21. Id.
22. Id, see also P.S. ATIYAH, THE RIsE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 698-703
(1979) (discussing the growing acceptance of restrictive covenants in the early twentieth
century).
23. Blake, supra note 13, at 638.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir.
1898), affd as modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (stating that while a covenant not to
compete may be in restraint of trade, it may also be upheld where ancillary to an
employment contract or to the sale of a business). See generally P.S. ATWYAH, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 337-42 (4th ed. 1989) (discussing
contemporary acceptance of restrictive covenants in the English employment context).
1995]
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judicial determination of enforceability.26  This standard entails a
determination of whether the restrictive covenant is "reasonable in
light of the circumstances"2 7 surrounding its existence."' The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts sets out two factors for determin-
ing the requisite levels of reasonableness. 9 First, the covenant must
be no broader than necessary to protect the employer.3" Second, the
hardship imposed on the employee must not outweigh the protection
afforded the employer.3 ' Additionally, some courts require that the
covenant not be injurious to the public 2
In determining whether the burden placed on the employee is
unreasonable, 33 courts have looked to both the temporal and
geographic elements of the covenant.M While there are no absolute
rules for determining whether a restrictive covenant is temporally too
long or geographically too broad, 3 courts will generally look first to
26. See generally ATIYAH, supra note 25, at 337-42.
27. Note, The Antitrust Implications of Employee Noncompete Agreements: A Labor Market
Analysis, 66 MiNN. L. REv. 519, 520 (1982).
28. Id.
29. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1979). For a lucid explanation
of the determination of reasonableness, see the comments accompanying the
Restatement.
30. Id. See also Purchasing Assocs. v. Weitz, 196 N.E.2d 245, 249 (N.Y. 1963)
(holding that a geographic restriction consisting of a 300 mile radius around New York
City was overly broad given an absence of proof as to the uniqueness of the employee's
skills).
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188 (1979). See also Smith,
Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 406 A.2d 1310, 1313 (N.H. 1979) (holding that covenant
not to compete imposed unnecessary hardship on employee).
32. See, e.g., Unishops, Inc. v. May's Family Centers, Inc., 399 N.E.2d 760,764 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1980) (holding a restrictive covenant to conform to public policy where the
covenantor was prevented from opening a competing business within a five mile
radius). Cf Pemco Corp. v. Rose, 257 S.E.2d 885, 891-92 (W. Va. 1979) (striking down
a restrictive covenant that prevented the employee from competing with the covenantee
within a 150 mile radius of covenantee's business as violative of public policy since it
prohibited the employee from utilizing personal talents).
33. See Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 270 Minn. 525, 534, 134 N.W.2d 892,
899 (1965). For an excellent discussion of the general aspects of restrictive covenants,
including the burden on the employee, see Sara C. Kinsey, Enforceability of
Non-Competition Provisions in Executive Employment Agreements: A Fresh Look at New York
Law, 36 N.Y.L ScH. L REv. 427 (1991).
34. See Kinsey, supra note 33, at 439-42 (stating that the same general analysis of
reasonableness applies to temporal duration; that is, the amount of time involved must
be appropriate to protect a legitimate interest).
35. Id. at 439. See also Bennett, 270 Minn. at 535, 134 N.W.2d at 899 (citing to
numerous authorities relating to restrictive covenants, and concluding that the necessity
of the restriction is dependent on the circumstances for each case).
[Vol. 21
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the interest the employer seeks to protect in deciding the appropriate
duration and scope of the restrictions.3 6
The geographic scope of the interest the employer seeks to protect
will depend largely on the nature of the business.3 7 For example,
one court has held that a radius of one hundred miles went beyond
the interest the employer sought to protect (it's prosthetics business)
and was therefore overly broad. 8 In that case, the one hundred mile
radius was in effect for each of the employer's branch offices around
the state of Iowa such that the practical effect was to bar the employee
from working anywhere in the state. 9 Another court upheld a
worldwide restriction on competition where the employer, a manufac-
turer of oil drilling platforms, conducted business on a global scale.'
Thus the presence or absence of a specific geographic limit is not
dispositive of the issue of enforceability. Provided that the covenant
is well tailored to protect a legitimate interest of the employer, some
courts have concluded that a lack of geographic bounds will not
render a covenant unreasonable." Similarly, where a geographic
limit is lacking, and the court determines one is necessary, many
courts are willing to simply provide a limit and uphold the covenant
36. For examples of protectable interests, see Raymundo v. Hammond Clinic Ass'n,
405 N.E.2d 65, 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (finding clinic has protectable interest
precluding doctor from working within reasonable territorial limits); Snelling and
Snelling, Inc. v. Dupay Enterprises, Inc., 609 P.2d 1062, 1064-65 (Ariz. CL App. 1980)
(finding legitimate interest in precluding licensee from competing with licensor);
Marcoin, Inc. v. Waldron, 259 S.E.2d 438, 435 (Ga. 1979) (finding a legitimate interest
in preventing employee from diverting customers, considering employee was the only
one available in 14 county area with his skills); Renwood Food Products, Inc. v.
Schaefer, 223 S.W.2d 144, 152 (Mo. CL App. 1949) (finding a legitimate interest in
protecting employer's trade connections).
37. 6A ARTHUR L CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1386 (1962).
38. Lamp v. American Prosthetics, Inc., 379 N.W.2d 909,911 (Iowa 1986) (finding
covenant too broad to protect legitimate interest).
39. Id. at 910.
40. De Long Corp. v. Lucas, 176 F. Supp. 104, 121-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), af'd 278
F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 833 (1960) (recognizing the global nature
of De Long Corporation's business; the company built floating dock and barge systems
and was involved in the design and production of offshore oil drilling platforms).
41. See, e.g., Lee v. Watsco, Inc., 263 So.2d 241, 243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972)
(recognizing that geographic limits are not necessary to enforcement of restrictive
covenants); Mixing Equip. Co. v. Philadelphia Gear, Inc., 436 F.2d 1308, 1314 (3d Cir.
1971) (stating that covenants without geographic limits are not necessarily invalid).
1995]
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as modified.42  This practice, known as blue penciling,4 s while not
universal," is quite common.
45
B. Minnesota Law
Minnesota courts have long recognized and upheld restrictive
covenants in the employment context.46 In Bennett v. Storz Broadcast-
ing Co.,47 however, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that restric-
tive covenants are commonly considered to be at least partially in
restraint of trade, and therefore are to receive close judicial scrutiny.
4
42. See, e.g., Toch v. Eric Schuster Corp., 490 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tex. Civ. App.
1972).
43. The blue pencil rule is an outgrowth of the doctrine of contract divisibility.
In other words, if the illegal or unreasonable aspects of a contract are divisible from
its acceptable elements, those illegal or unreasonable elements may be crossed out so
as to allow the contract to survive. 6A ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 1390, at 67-69 (1962). For an excellent, albeit somewhat remedial, discussion of the
blue pencil doctrine see ALFRED G. FELIU, PRIMER ON INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 61
(1992).
44. See Bess v. Bothman, 257 N.W.2d 791, 794 (Minn. 1977). The Bess court held
that courts can modify unreasonable aspects of a contract, whether or not such aspects
are formally divisible from the rest of the contract. Id. This is distinguishable from
blue penciling since the unreasonable aspects of the contract are not deleted, but
instead altered so as to be reasonable in the given situation. I&
45. SeeJeffrey G. Grody, Patial Enforcement Of Post-Employment Restricive Covenants,
15 COLUM.J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 181, 196-97 (1979).
46. See, e.g., Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 270 Minn. 525, 533 n.2, 134 N.W.2d
892, 898 n.2 (1965) (providing a comprehensive list of Minnesota cases dealing with
restrictive covenants); Kronschnabel-Smith Co. v. Kronschnabel, 87 Minn. 230, 234, 91
N.W. 892, 893 (1902) (determining that testing the reasonableness of the restriction
is appropriate); National Benefit Co. v. Union Hosp. Co., 45 Minn. 272, 276, 47 N.W.
806, 807 (1891) (upholding a restrictive covenant in the context of the sale of a
business).
47. 270 Minn. 525, 134 N.W.2d 892 (1965). The Bennett court described the
general approach to restrictive covenants as follows:
In considering the record as it relates to the issue of justification for the
action taken by defendant, it seems to us that the first inquiry should be
whether or not the contract upon which defendant relies creates an interest
which the law will protect. In this connection it should be immediately
recognized that the agreement is one in partial restraint of trade since it
limits the right of a party to work and to earn a livelihood. Such contracts
are looked upon with disfavor, cautiously considered, and carefully scruti-
nized.
Id. at 533, 134 N.W.2d at 898 (citing Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 105
N.E.2d 685, 693 (Ct. C.P. Cuyahoga County, Ohio 1952)).
48. Bennett, 270 Minn. at 533, 134 N.W.2d at 898. See also Freeman v. Duluth
Clinic, Ltd., 334 N.W.2d 626, 630 (Minn. 1983). The Freeman court stated that
"covenants not to compete are agreements in partial restraint of trade, limiting as they
do the right of a party to work and earn a livelihood." Id. (citing Bennett v. Storz
Broadcasting Co., 270 Minn. 525, 533, 134 N.W.2d 892, 898 (1965)). The court went
on to note that "courts, including this one, look upon such contracts with disfavor and
scrutinize them with care." Freeman, 334 N.W.2d at 630 (citing National Recruiters, Inc.
[Vol. 21
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Despite this scrutiny, however, restrictive covenants have been
upheld in Minnesota provided they have met the accepted standard
of reasonableness. 9 The reasonableness test has been well an-
nounced in Minnesota.5" To establish that a restrictive covenant is
reasonable, an employer must show that the covenant is necessary for
the protection of the business,5 and that any burden placed on the
employee is not greater than necessary to protect the interest of the
employer.52 Where the restriction is broader than necessary, either
temporally or geographically, Minnesota courts will generally see it as
invalid. 5
Finally, Minnesota courts do recognize the blue pencil doctrine."
For example, in Bess v. Bothmar?5 the Minnesota Supreme Court
affirmed a trial court's enforcement of only the reasonable elements
of a restrictive covenant.5 6  In Bess the court modified a covenant
contained in the sale of a towing business so as to reduce both its
temporal and geographic elements, thus bringing the covenants within
the bounds of reasonableness.57
v. Cashman 323 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1982)).
49. Holliston v. Erston, 124 Minn. 49, 144 N.W. 415 (1913). The Holliston court
stated as follows: "This court... adopted the doctrine of reasonableness of restraint
as controlling when neither monopolistic nor within the inhibition of antitrust laws.
Arbitrary rules theretofore applied in some jurisdictions were discarded and the
modem doctrine [i.e., reasonableness] has since been consistently followed and must
be considered established." Id. at 51, 144 N.W. at 415-16.
50. See, e.g., Kronschnabel-Smith Co. v. Kronschnabel, 87 Minn. 230, 234, 91 N.W.
892, 893 (1902) (recognizing reasonableness test).
51. See, e.g., Klick v. Crosstown State Bank of Ham Lake, Inc., 372 N.W.2d 85, 87
(Minn. CL App. 1985) (considering whether an employer's reasonable interestjustified
the restrictive covenant in an employment contract); Eutectic Welding Alloys Corp. v.
West, 281 Minn. 13, 20, 160 N.W.2d 566, 571 (1968) (holding two restrictive covenants
unenforceable, unreasonable, and beyond the scope of employer's protectable interest).
52. Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 270 Minn. 525, 534, 134 N.W.2d 892, 899
(1965) (citing Arthur Murray Dance Studios v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 691-92 (Ct. C.P.
Cuyahoga County, Ohio 1952) and Briggs v. Bulter, 45 N.E.2d 757, 762 (Ohio 1942)).
53. See, e.g., Jim W. Miller Constr., Inc. v. Schaefer, 298 N.W.2d 455, 458 (Minn.
1980); Davies & Davies Agency, Inc., v. Davies, 298 N.W.2d 127, 131 (Minn. 1980).
While this notion of reasonableness does offer at least an assumption of objectivity,
pursuant to Minnesota law these issues are decided on a case by case basis. See
Medtronic, Inc. v. Gibbons, 527 F. Supp. 1085, 1094 (D. Minn. 1981), affd 684 F.2d
565, 569 (8th Cir. 1982).
54. See, e.g., Davies, 298 N.W.2d at 131; see supra note 43; see also Bess v. Bothman,
257 N.W.2d 791, 794-95 (Minn. 1977). For a general discussion of the blue pencil
doctrine, see Note, Catherine Bergin Yalung, Redefining The Blue Pencil Rule: Phoenix
Orthcpaedic Surgeons, Ltd. v. Peairs, 23 ARIZ. ST. hJ. 859 (1991).
55. 257 N.W.2d 791 (Minn. 1977).
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III. Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch
A. The Facts
Dynamic Air Incorporated ("Dynamic Air") is a Minnesota corpora-
tion, with its headquarters in St. Paul, which custom designs bulk
moving systems for industrial clients." Mr. Bloch worked at Dynamic
Air as an intern while pursuing an undergraduate degree in industrial
technology.5 9 When he graduated,' Mr. Bloch became a full time
sales engineer.6'
Upon becoming a full-time employee, Mr. Bloch signed an
employment contract with Dynamic Air.62 This contract contained
covenants that, in the event his employment with Dynamic Air was
terminated, restricted him from disclosing confidential information
pertaining to Dynamic Air,6' from soliciting their customers,' and
from working for a competitor.6 The covenants against solicitation
and employment were both limited to two years in length,66 though
there was no provision for geographic limits.6
In August of 1991, Mr. Bloch received a promotion and became a
sales manager 68 for a region in the southern United States.69 Given
this position of authority, Bloch was privy to several sensitive aspects
of Dynamic Air's business practices. 70  Despite this promotion,
58. Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch, 502 N.W.2d 796, 798 (Minn. CL App. 1993).
59. Id. at 797.






66. Id. at 797-98.
67. Id. at 798. Thus the covenants lacked the traditional reasonable time and
space elements. See Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 270 Minn. 525, 535, 134 N.W.2d
892, 899 (1965). Bloch was to be compensated by Dynamic Air after any termination
in the event he was unable to secure similar employment elsewhere at the same salary
level. Dynamic Air, 502 N.W.2d at 798. There is no explanation of how Bloch was to
find "similar employment elsewhere" when he was subject to a restrictive covenant that
had no geographic limits. Id.
68. Dynamic Air, 502 N.W.2d at 798. By August 1991, Mr. Bloch had been
employed by Dynamic Air for two years. Id.
69. Id. This southern region included the states of Texas, Oklahoma and
Arkansas. Id.
70. Id. For instance, James Steele, Dynamic Air's president, said that Bloch had
"direct responsibility" for bidding on new projects. Id. Bloch was also familiar with
pricing strategies, testing methods and engineering practices. Id.
[Vol. 21
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however, Mr. Bloch began seeking a new employer in October of
1992,71 and eventually, in March of 1993, took a position with Whirl-
Air, Incorporated ("Whirl-Air").72
Whirl-Air is also a Minnesota corporation and is involved in largely
the same business as is Dynamic Air.73  Dynamic Air considered
Bloch's employment at Whirl-Air to be violative of the restrictive
covenants to which Bloch had agreed.74 Dynamic Air was concerned
that Whirl-Air would achieve an unfair advantage as a result of Bloch's
understanding of Dynamic Air's bidding strategy and currently open
proposals.75
Dynamic Air sought to enjoin Bloch from working at Whirl Air.
76
Dynamic Air also sought a temporary injunction enforcing the
restrictive covenants in his original agreement. 77 The district court,
in a somewhat incongruous holding,78 denied the temporary in-
junction on the assumption that restrictive covenants lacking
geographic restraints are not enforceable in Minnesota.79
71. Id. The appellate court's decision offers no reason why Mr. Bloch decided to
pursue a different employer. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. The court states that Whirl-Air "designs and manufactures custom-made
'systems' for moving bulk materials." Id
74. Id. In March, 1993, Dynamic Air president, James Steele, told Mr. Bloch that
working for Whirl-Air would be a breach of the restrictive covenants. Id.
75. Id. Whirl-Air obviously disputes this position. Id. Gregg Hedtke, sales
manager for Whirl-Air, stated that "the nature of sales in this business is different from
that in other businesses." Id. This is apparently due to the fact that sales are not
dependant on the accumulation of customer lists which represent repeat business. ld,
76. Id.
77. Id. The restrictive covenants in Mr. Bloch's agreement prohibited him from
"(1) disclosing confidential information about Dynamic Air, (2) soliciting Dynamic Air
customers with whom he had worked; and (3) working for a competitor of Dynamic
Air selling 'conflicting products.'" Id. at 797.
78. Id. 799. As stated in the appellate court's decision, the district court found as
follows:
1. Dynamic Air would suffer immediate, irreparable harm from disclosure of
confidential information.
2. The terms of the restrictive agreement were reasonable and necessary to
protect Dynamic Air's legitimate commercial interests.
3. Bloch's employment with Whirl-Air risked disclosure of confidential
information.
4. The harm to Dynamic Air from denial of its motion would be greater than
the harm to Bloch from granting of the motion.
Id. Nonetheless, the district court proceeded to deny the temporary injunction citing
an unpublished case. Id. The appellate court, in reversing, pointed out that under
Minnesota Statutes section 480A.08, subd. 3(c) such unpublished opinions are, at best,
persuasive. Id at 800.
79. Id. at 799.
1995]
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B. The Court's Holding and Reasoning
The Minnesota Court of Appeals, in the process of reversing the
trial court's denial of Dynamic Air's motion for temporary injunction,
held that restrictive covenants lacking geographic limits are not per se
invalid.8" Moreover, the appellate court concluded that the reason-
ableness of the nonsolicitation and confidentiality covenants may be
judged without regard to the lack of geographic restraints. 81 The
court also expressly cautioned the trial court to carefully scrutinize the
nonemployment covenant.82 In reaching these conclusions, the
appellate court adhered to the doctrine of reasonableness,85 suggest-
ing that this determination is best left to the trial courts." The
appellate court then remanded the matter to the trial court for a more
inclusive consideration of the facts.8"
IV. Analysis
The Dynamic Air court correctly held that restrictive covenants
lacking geographic limits are not per se unenforceable.8" To have
held otherwise would have posed severe problems for corporations
conducting business on a global scale.87
Dynamic Air sought, through the restrictive covenants it entered
into with Mr. Bloch, to protect a legitimate business interest.88 Mr.
80. Id. at 800. This was not an entirely audacious holding; the court stated as
follows: "1he covenant must be scrutinized as a whole to determine whether it is
reasonable. A restrictive covenant lacking a territorial limit perhaps will often be held
to be unreasonable. Nonetheless, we are reluctant to enunciate a per se rule barring
enforceability of all restrictive covenants lacking such a limit." Id.
81. The court stated that "[c]ommon sense" might lead them to the conclusion
that a geographic limit in a confidentiality or nonsolicitation covenant could often be
irrelevant. Id (citing Rollins Burdick Hunter of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Hamilton, 304
N.W.2d 752 (Wis. 1981)).
82. Dynamic Air, 502 N.W.2d at 800.
83. Id. at 799.
84. Id. at 800; see aLso Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 270 Minn. 525, 535-36,
134 N.W.2d 892, 899-900 (1965).
85. Dynamic Air, 502 N.W.2d at 800.
86. Id.
87. For instance, a multinational corporation would have no predetermined legal
standard from which to draft a restrictive covenant. Moreover, had the Dynamic Air
court ruled that covenants without geographic bounds were per se unenforceable, the
entire standard of reasonableness would have been threatened. Lacking such a
standard, multinational corporations could conceivably face a greater threat of
litigation.
88. Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch, 502 N.W.2d 796, 798 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
Dynamic Air president, James Steele, stated that Mr. Bloch had knowledge of Dynamic
Air's then open proposals and bidding strategies. Id. The district court also found that
Dynamic Air had a legitimate commercial interest to protect through enforcement of
(Vol. 21
10
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 16
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol21/iss1/16
RESTRICTVE COVENAN7S
Bloch, after his promotion of August of 1991,9 had "direct responsi-
bility for developing Dynamic Air's bids for new projects."90 This
responsibility put him in a position where he had access to sensitive
information9' which could harm Dynamic Air in the event a competi-
tor became privy to this information. 92 For example, Mr. Bloch had
access to vendor lists as well as engineering information, either of
which could be used contrary to Dynamic Air's interests, regardless of
where Mr. Bloch was employed.9" Given the sensitivity of the
information involved, the appellate court correctly determined that
geographic bounds are irrelevant as they relate to the confidentiality
and nonsolicitation covenants.
The burden the restrictions placed on Mr. Bloch was not greater
than the threat to Dynamic Air's interests. 4 The covenants restricted
Mr. Bloch from soliciting Dynamic Air's customers and from compet-
ing with Dynamic Air for two years.95 Two years is not an unreason-
able amount of time given existing case law.96 Equally as important
is the fact that Mr. Bloch was to be paid by Dynamic Air during any
portion of this two year period that he was unable to secure suitable
the restrictive covenants. Id. at 799. But cf. Jim W. Miller Constr., Inc. v. Schaefer, 298
N.W.2d 455, 458 (Minn. 1980) (finding no protectable interest where the employee
was, by a restrictive covenant, precluded from operating solely as a real estate broker
but was allowed to take a position with a real estate broker, though the activities carried
out by the employee were identical).
89. Id. at 798.
90. Id.
91. Id. Mr. Bloch, an engineer, had access to Dynamic Air's "designs, formulas,
confidential price lists, engineering drawings, and testing methods." Id. It is not,
however, always necessary for the employee to have unique talents in order to be
subject to the enforcement of a restrictive covenant. See Eutectic Corp. v.
Astralloy-Vulcan Corp., 510 F.2d 1111, 1115 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that in NewYork
a covenant with reasonable time and geographic limits is enforceable regardless of
whether the employee has unique skills).
92. Dynamic Air, 502 N.W.2d at 798.
93. Id. The actual economic damage Mr. Bloch might have been able to inflict
on Dynamic Air is, of course, impossible to evaluate. It should be noted, however, that
the district court did make a finding that Dynamic Air would "suffer immediate,
irreparable harm from disclosure" of the confidential information in Mr. Bloch's
possession. Id. at 799.
94. See Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 270 Minn. 525, 534, 134 N.W.2d 892,
899 (1965) (holding that restrictions that are broader than necessary to protect the
employers interest are invalid).
95. Dynamic Air, 502 N.W.2d at 797.
96. Although each case is determined on its own factual basis, precedent may still
be used for support. See, e.g., B & Y Metal Painting, Inc. v. Ball, 279 N.W.2d 813, 815
(Minn. 1979) (finding a three year restriction reasonable); Cherne Indus., Inc. v.
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employment. 97 While not dispositive," this fact goes far toward
establishing that any burden on an employee under contract is less
than the danger to the employer of non-enforcement.99 Though the
appellate court did not disagree with the district court's finding that
the burden of enforcement of the employment covenant on Mr. Bloch
was less than the danger of disclosure, the court did wisely caution the
district court, on remand, to scrutinize the employment covenant
carefully."
Having recognized that the rule of reasonableness is flexible enough
to allow trial courts to determine the enforceability of restrictive
covenants,' the Dynamic Air court correctly concluded that a per se
rule of invalidity based on a lack of geographic restraints is simply not
necessary.1°' Whether the geographic scope of the restrictive
covenant is reasonable will necessarily depend on the particular facts
of each case. 10 3 What may work in one situation may be entirely
inappropriate for another. For instance, in Davies & Davies Agency,
Inc. v. Davies,'" the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a restrictive
covenant, operating against an insurance agent, would only be
enforceable in Hennepin county. 5  As originally drafted, the
97. Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch, 502 N.W.2d 796, 798 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). An
analysis of the burden on the employee might very well be different were it not for the
fact that Dynamic Air was to pay Mr. Bloch in the event that he was not able to find
suitable employment.
98. Receiving compensation of this sort would seem to lessen the burden on the
employee, but it must be seen as a palliative at best. For instance, during the two year
period that Mr. Bloch would be forced to put his career on hold he would be losing
the opportunity to gain seniority in a new company. He could be losing the chance
to establish retirement benefits, and it would seem almost certain that, in the event he
was not allowed to work in his chosen career for two years, he would be passing up
valuable opportunities that could earn him a promotion.
99. See Kinsey, supra note 33, at 439-42.
100. Dynamic Air, 502 N.W.2d at 800.
101. Id. See also Bennett v. Storz Broadcasting Co., 270 Minn. 525, 533, 134 N.W.2d
892, 898 (1965).
102. Aside from being unnecessary, it would, in many respects, be unworkable. For
instance, General Motors operates all over the world. The competitive effect is the
same to the corporation regardless of whether a former employee competes with
General Motors in the far east or in Detroit. A per se rule invalidating restrictive
covenants without geographic bounds would fail to recognize this economic reality. See
Mixing Equip. Co. v. Philadelphia Gear, Inc., 436 F.2d 1308, 1314 (3d. Cir. 1971)
(stating that covenants without spatial limits are not necessarily unreasonable).
103. See Kinsey, supra note 33, at 439. "The reasonableness of territorial restrictions
appears to depend more on the reasonableness of the particular restriction in view of
the facts and circumstances of each individual case, rather than on actual geographical
scope." Id.
104. 298 N.W.2d 127, 132 (Minn. 1980) (amending a covenant so as to make it
reasonable).
105. Id. at 131.
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covenant was designed to prevent the employee from competing with
the employer within a fifty mile radius of Minneapolis, St. Paul or
Duluth.'0 6  In Continental Group, Inc. v. Kinsley,"° however, the
court upheld a covenant touching three continents. 0 8 In that case,
the court reasoned that the technology involved in the manufacture
of plastic soft drink containers was competitive enough to render the
geographic scope of this covenant reasonable.'0
9
Had the court held that restrictive covenants lacking geographic
limits were per se invalid, it would not only have been behaving
contrary to accepted principles,"0 it would have left employers with
no guidance or standards for drafting restrictive covenants, other than
the necessity of some geographic limitation."' Moreover, given the
fact that Minnesota courts are free to blue pencil restrictive covenants,
a per se rule disallowing the enforcement of covenants lacking geo-
graphic limits seems largely unnecessary."' For instance, in Bess v.
Bothman,"3 the trial court took a restrictive covenant containing no
geographic limits and reduced it to an area suitable to protect the
employer's interest."'
This is not to advocate that Minnesota courts ignore the geographic
element of restrictive covenants, nor should Minnesota courts use the
Dynamic Air decision to support the position that restrictive covenants
lacking temporal and geographic elements are enforceable. The
Dynamic Air holding should be taken to reaffirm the position that the
reasonableness of the geographic limits in restrictive covenants must
be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case. Whether the
scope of a restrictive covenant is reasonable must depend on the
nature of the business, the interest it seeks to protect and the danger
106. Id. at 129.
107. 422 F.Supp. 838 (D. Conn. 1976).
108. Bess v. Bothman, 422 F. Supp. 838, 841-43 (D. Conn 1976).
109. Id. at 844.
110. See, e.g., Mixing Equip. Co. v. Philadelphia Gear, Inc., 436 F.2d 1308, 1314 (3d
Cir. 1971) (holding that geographic limits are not necessary to the enforcement of
restrictive covenants). See also Rollins Burdick Hunter of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Hamilton,
304 N.W.2d 752, 755 (Wis. 1981) (stating that "the absence of a geographical limitation
is not necessarily fatal.").
111. Employers attempting to draft effective restrictive covenants would thus have
no legitimate parameters by which to draw a territorial barrier. See, e.g., Bennett v.
Storz Broadcasting Co., 270 Minn. 525, 535-36, 134 N.W.2d 892, 899-900 (1965).
112. See supra note 43. It must also be kept in mind that in the event restrictive
covenants lacking territorial limits were declared per se unenforceable, the blue pencil
doctrine would, in effect, be taken away from the trial courts. They would no longer
have the ability to redraw geographic limits into covenants that do not have them. See,
e.g., Bess v. Bothman, 257 N.W.2d 791, 795 (Minn. 1977).
113. 257 N.W.2d 791 (Minn. 1977).
114. Id. at 795.
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nonenforcement poses to the company."5 The Dynamic Air court
wisely recognized this need for flexibility.
V. Conclusion
Dynamic Air established that restrictive covenants in employment
agreements, limited in time but not in geography, are not per se
unenforceable in Minnesota." 6 This note supports the Dynamic Air
decision for two reasons. First, it is entirely in line with established
case law. Second, the decision allows for an ad hocjudicial determina-
tion of the validity of restrictive covenants based on the rule of
reasonableness.
Adam Dowd
115. Id. Another excellent example of the reasonableness of restrictive covenants
is Continental Group, Inc. v. Kinsley. 422 F.Supp. 838, 844-45 (D. Conn. 1976). The
employer was in the incipient and highly competitive business of producing plastic
bottles. Id. The court found that the employee potentially posed a legitimate threat
to the employer's business in the event he went to work for a competitor; thus a
covenant with a seemingly expansive reach was upheld as reasonable. Id.
116. Id. at 800.
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